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The purpose of this thesis is to explore the question of whether there exists any 
difference in the use of the Spanish healthcare services between privately and publicly insured 
individuals. The analysis is carried out using two different estimation techniques, matching on 
the propensity score and inverse probability weighting, using the 2017 National Health Survey. 
Twelve different outcomes are taken into account in assessing the difference in the use of 
preventive health controls between individuals with private health coverage and individuals 
with public health coverage only. Results revealed that privately insured individuals take 
preventive health checkups more frequently in comparison to individuals with public 
coverage, despite finding no differences in their self-assessed health status. 
 
Keywords: Health care utilization, preventive health, private health insurance, average 
treatment effect on the treated. 
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In recent years, the study of health care systems and their use has reached a great 
dimension in the field of health economics, since there is a direct relationship between health, 
the economy and the development of a society. As a result, there is a growing concern about 
the situation of health resources, given the complexity and high cost of their services. 
The Spanish case is no exception and even more interesting for the analysis because 
of the structure of the Spanish health care system and the lingering effects of the 2008 crisis. 
The first aspect has motivated several authors to analyse the relationship between the 
private and public health sectors. Since the Spanish health care system offers public universal 
coverage, contracting private health insurance results in double coverage. In that sense, there 
appear to be no evident reasons as to why individuals would hire private health insurance, 
which has led numerous researchers to study its determinants and effects on the health care 
system. 
As a consequence of the crisis, the Spanish government has been looking for ways to 
cut the excessive healthcare expenditure, resulting in a series of austerity measures affecting 
the quality of the public health care system. The difficulties that patients have to endure are 
mainly reflected in the long waiting list for consultations with specialists or specific 
examinations and the increase of co-payments. As expected and according to Kentikelenis et 
al. 2011, this expenditure reduction led users to have a worse perception of the quality of the 
public health care system.  
However, these emerging problems are not taking place in the private health sector, 
resulting in an increase in the number of private healthcare policies [(Sigüenza and Mariel 
2015)]. Furthermore, one of the solutions proposed to reduce both cost and the waiting lists 
is to use and finance private health care [Cantarero et al. 2017)]. Nevertheless, some authors 
expressed that this fiscal policy is regressive and unfair since it subsidises the capacity to pay 
and not the service itself [Freire (1999), Rodríguez (2001), Simó (2009)]. 
Within this framework, the relevance of studying the Spanish health care system and 
how individuals make use of it arises. Identifying whether there are differences in the use of 
the health care system between publicly and privately insured individuals contributes to a 
better understanding of the problems of the Spanish health care system and more importantly 
to seek more sustainable solutions for it. 
The literature about the Spanish health care system has centred mainly on two points. 
On one hand, the study of the demand and determinants of private health insurance. 
Generally, the studies coincided on the relevance of socio-economics, socio-demographic and 
some health variables that influence the decision of having double-coverage [González (1995), 
Jofre (2000), Costa and García (2002 and 2003), López-Casasnovas and Sáez (2005), Ordaz et 
al. (2005), Rodríguez and Stoyanova (2008), Sigüenza and Mairel (2015)].  On the other hand, 
other authors have studied the effects of double-coverage on the utilisation of the health care 
system, such as, the number of consultations, hospital services and the use of emergency 
rooms [Szabó (1997), Vera-Hernández (1999), Propper (2000), Harmon and Nolan (2001), 
Rodríguez and Stoyanova (2004), Sigüenza and Mairel (2015), Cantarero et al. (2017)]. 
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The objective of this work is to analyse the effects of having private health insurance 
on the utilisation of the Spanish health care system trying to identify if there are differences 
between privately and publicly insured individuals. The contribution of this work relies on the 
focus of the analysis on preventive health, particularly on the correct follow-up of general 
medical checks and oncology tests. 
Preventive health care is crucial as public health policy. It encourages healthy habits 
and regular medical checks in order to prevent and detect diseases. As Esperato and García 
(2007) expressed, some studies have shown the importance of preventive health, denoting 
the importance of early treatment and detection of disease, and remarking the efficiency of 
investing in preventive policies. 
Within this context of service quality, it would be expected that one of the areas most 
affected by public budget cuts on health would be the preventive services. As Sigüenza and 
Mariel (2015) explained, preventive health would have a high time cost when performed 
under public coverage (taking into account the large number of tests that would have to be 
performed) and a high monetary cost if done privately. Then, having private health insurance 
helps to control and reduce these costs, and it would be expected that those individuals under 
this coverage could make use of health services more intensively.  
When the use of the healthcare system is analysed, it is important to determine 
whether there are differences in the use of preventive health services between individuals 
with public coverage and individuals with double coverage. Should there be significant 
differences, it would be interesting to study whether these differences are due to insurance 
type characteristics (say, waiting time on the waiting list) or to individual characteristics (say, 
income). Finally and more importantly, it is worth examining if these differences could imply 
differences in individuals´ health status. 
To carry out this analysis, the latest microdata of the Spanish National Health Survey 
(SNHS 2017) is used. Causal inference techniques, namely, matching on the propensity score 
and inverse probability weighting are applied, to compare the use of preventive health 
services between privately and publicly insured individuals. 
This work is structured in four sections. The first one corresponds to the introduction 
of the project. The second part presents the methodology and the data used on the 
estimations. The third shows the results obtained from the estimations, and finally, the 
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2 Methodology and data description 
2.1 Methodology 
 
In order to identify the effect of holding private health insurance on the use of the 
Spanish health care system, causal inference methods are used. For that, it is necessary to 
define the treatment and control group. The treatment group is defined as the group that has 
been exposed to a certain change, in this case, having private health insurance. Then this 
group will be compared on the outcomes related to the correct follow-up of medical checks, 
with individuals with similar characteristics but who have not been exposed to treatment. This 
last group is called the control group and is composed of individuals who only have public 
health coverage.  
Following this methodology, it would be possible to compare both groups and assess 
the influence of holding private insurance. In other terms, the mean difference in potential 
outcomes for those exposed to treatment is estimated. This is defined as the Average 
Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET). Mathematically, 
 
𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑇 = 𝔼(𝑌1𝑖 − 𝑌0𝑖|𝐷𝑖 = 1), (1) 
 
where 𝐷𝑖  denotes the treatment indicator, being one for treated individuals and zero for 
individuals in the control group, and 𝑌1i and 𝑌0i the potential outcomes, that is, the outcomes 
individual 𝑖 would obtain under private health insurance and under just public coverage, 
respectively. Notice that, for the treated, I can observe the potential outcome under 
treatment but fail to observe the potential outcome under no treatment. 
The methodologies implemented in the analysis are explained below. Defining a model 
that characterizes and distinguishes individuals who are more likely to have private health 
insurance, that is, identifies the probability of being treated, is the first step. Once the model 
is properly defined, and it is possible to identify the characteristics that determine contracting 
private health insurance, I compare the outcomes of those with private insurance with the 
outcomes of those who only have public coverage. The idea is to compare individuals in the 
treatment group with those who have similar observable characteristics in the control group. 
The techniques used to make this comparison are matching on the propensity score and 
inverse probability weighting. 
Since this is an observational study, the selection into treatment is not random; some 
individuals choose to have private health insurance. Thus, it has to be assumed that, 
conditional on individual characteristics, potential outcomes are independent of this 
treatment assignment. This is known as unconfoundedness and it will allow us to compare 
similar individuals in terms of pre-treatment variables. 
Moreover, the probability of treatment depends on the individuals observable 
characteristics. Therefore, the probability of being exposed to treatment, known as the 
propensity score, is given by, 
𝑝(𝒙𝑖) = Pr(𝐷𝑖 = 1 | 𝒙𝑖) = 𝐹(𝒙𝑖𝛽𝑖|𝒙𝑖), (2) 
 
where  𝐷𝑖  the dependent binary variable as, 
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𝒙𝑖 is a vector of covariates that helps to explain and control the variability of the dependent 
variable. Following Imbens and Rubin (2015), it is considered in this set variables that could 
not be affected by treatment and as many as possible to control and explain the variability of 
having private health insurance. 
Equation (2) is estimated by Maximum Likelihood and a logistic distribution is 
assumed. 
Once the propensity score is defined, different techniques to estimate the average 
treatment effect on the treated are applied. First, matching on the propensity score is used, 
considering different levels of matching: one to one matching (m=1), and also one to four 
matches (m=4). This method matches individuals in the treatment group with those in the 
control group with similar characteristics, based on the probability of having private health 
insurance. More precisely, each treated individual 𝑖 will be matched with individual 𝑗 on the 
control group when the difference in the propensity score is minimized. As such, it is necessary 
to assume common support or overlap condition, which ensures that there would be sufficient 
overlap in the characteristics of individuals between both treated and control groups to find 
adequate matches. 
Inverse probability weighting is the other method applied. It calculates the average 
treatment effect on the treated, weighting the difference in means by the probability of being 
exposed to treatment, that is, having private health insurance. Recalling that 𝐷𝑖  is the 
treatment indicator, 𝑌i the observed outcomes, and 𝑝(𝒙𝑖) the propensity score, the average 










Inverse probability weighting weights up untreated units, that have a low probability 
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2.2  Description of the data 
  
The analysis of this work is performed with the latest micro-data from the Spanish 
National Health Survey 2017 (SNHS). It is conducted by the National Statistics Institute (INE) 
and it provides not only statistical information on the health of the population and its 
determinants but also socio-economics aspects. 
The SNHS consists of three microdata files: Household, Adult and Minor files. The 
Household file includes variables regarding the socio-economics and demographic status of 
the reference individual such as age, sex and income. While the Adult and Minor files contain 
variables referring to the health status and the use of the national health care system. 
Since the information is collected for the reference individual of the household, and 
the objective is to analyse the use of health services distinguishing those individuals who have 
private insurance from those who have not, only the Household and Adult files are used. After 
merging both data sets, it ends up with 23.089 observations for the reference individual of the 
household. 
The outcomes to be considered as a proxy of the utilisation of the health care system 
in the preventive area, taken from the SNHS, are summarised in Table 1. They were divided 
into two main groups, the correct follow-up of general medical checks and on the other hand, 
oncological check-ups. Following Cantarero et al. (2017), the number of visits to a general 
practitioner and specialist in order to measure the use of the healthcare system, are also 
considered. 
Under the Spanish health care system, oncological examinations are part of a screening 
strategy depending on individual or family antecedents and on the age of the individuals. If 
there are no previous conditions, the stool test should be performed once every two years for 
males and females between 50 and 69 years old. Mammogram screening is composed of 
females between 50 and 69 years old, and the examination should be performed once every 
two years. Finally, cervix cytology screening targets females between 25 and 65 years old. For 
the age group between 25 and 34, the test should be done once every three years and for 
those older than 34, the frequency changes with previous test results. If it is negative, the test 
will be done once every five years. In case that the test is positive, it would be done every 
year. 
 
Table 1: Definition of the outcomes for health service utilisation  
Correct follow-up of general medical checks Oncology check-ups 
General exam done in last twelve months Stool test analysis done in last two years 
Blood pressure checked in last twelve months Mammography done in last two years 
Cholesterol checked in last twelve months Cervix cytology test done in last two years 
Level of sugar in the blood checked in last twelve months  
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Table A.1 in the appendix section shows explanatory variables used in the estimations 
and their corresponding definition. Two big groups of variables were created in order to 
specify the main characteristic of the individuals. The first group provides information 
regarding the socio-demographic characteristics, whereas the second group collects 
information about the health status and health activities of the individual. 
Next, variables used to characterize the sample population in the socio-demographic 
aspect are presented. Gender is represented by a dummy variable; FEMALE that takes values 
equal to one for females and zeroes for males. 54% of the sample are women. 
Age was considered a continuous variable, ranging from 15 to 103. To distinguish a 
non-linear functional form, a quadratic polynomial of this variable is included.  TOWN_SIZE is 
a categorical variable that shows the size of the municipality where the individual lives, and 
for the analysis, dummy variables for each category were created to determine whether the 
size of the municipality has any influence on the decision of holding private health insurance.  
It could be expected that the structure of the household could influence the decision 
to purchase private health insurance. In this line, I created dummy variables for each of the 
different cases from the categorical variable HOUSEHOLD_TYPE, which shows how the 
household is composed. Almost 27% live in a house composed of a couple and a child under 
25 years old. Finally, in order to capture regional heterogeneity, 19 regional dummy were 
created, one for each autonomous community.   
On the socio-economics aspect, the level of education and income of the individuals 
were accounted for. In the SNHS, income is reported as a categorical variable with 12 
categories, and for the analysis, I created dummy variables for each of them. The median lies 
between those individuals earning 1300-1550 euros per month. 
The educational level is reflected by dummy variables created from the categorical 
variable EDUC, which shows the maximum level of education achieved by the individual. Half 
of the individuals in the sample have attained less than secondary school as their maximum 
educational level. The occupation status is also considered and is collected by dummy 
variables from the categorical variable OCCUP. 43% of the individuals have reported being 
employed, while almost 11% are unemployed. Finally, to show the civil status of the 
individuals, different dummy variables were created from the categorical variable 
CIVIL_STATUS. The majority of the population reported being married. 
With the purpose of analysing how individuals choose their health coverage, dummy 
variables were created to distinguish each case. For example, PUBLIC_INSURANCE takes 
values equal to one when the individual has public health coverage and zero in other cases. 
As it could have been expected because of the universal coverage, 95% of the sample has 
reported being under this type. However, as explained before, inside this population, there 
could also be individuals who decided on private health insurance. The variable 
DOUBLE_COVERAGE, takes values equal to one when this is the case and zero otherwise. 13% 
of the sample has double-coverage, holding public and private health insurance at the same 
time. 
As mentioned before, the SNHS provides a large variety of questions related to the 
health status of individuals. To consider previous or existing pathologies that the individual 
may have or have had; thirty dummy variables were generated. The most common ones are 
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osteoarthritis, chronic lumbar pain and high cholesterol. Moreover, variables concerning 
healthy and unhealthy habits were created. For unhealthy habits, it has dichotomous variables 
as DRINK, which is equal to one if the individual consumes alcohol regularly and zero 
otherwise. Another example is SMOKE, which takes values equal to one if the individual 
smokes and zero if the individual does not. 21% and 23% of individuals reported that they 
drink or smoke regularly. 
On the other hand, variables to characterize healthy habits are dummy variables 
created from the categorical EXERCISE, which reflects an individual's sports practice 
frequency. Most of them, 38% and 39% report doing no exercise at all or some exercise 
occasionally. For nutrition information, dummy variables showing whether individuals 
consume fruit, vegetables and legumes regularly were considered. A large part of the 
individuals said that they consume fruit and vegetables one or more times a day. While for 
legumes, almost 63% consumes it once or twice a week. In order to determine if the level of 
exercise performed at work has any influence in this sense, dummy variables were created 
from the categorical EXERCISE_ACTIVITY. 40% of the respondents reported that during their 
working hours they do not exert any relevant physical effort, since they remain seated for 
most of their labour. 
The last group of variables to be described are generated as the outcomes to be 
measured. Relating to the correct medical follow-up checks, it has two groups, general exams 
and oncology-related ones. Some examples for the first group are the correct follow-up of the 
blood pressure and the cholesterol level. These are represented by the binary variables 
CORRECT_BLOOD_PRESSURE and CORRECT_CHOLESTEROL respectively, which take values 
equal to one if the individuals have done this type of test at least once in the last 12 months. 
Around 79% of the individuals in the sample have done these tests during this period.  
The second group consists of oncology check-ups, including the examination of colon, 
breast, and cervical cancer. The dummy variables CORRECT_STOOLTEST, 
CORRECT_MAMMOGRAPHY and CORRECT_PAP, take values equal to one when the individual 
has done these corresponding examinations at least once in the last two years, and zero 
otherwise.  According to Table A.1 in the appendix, on average, almost 65% of the population 
of interest have done the stool test properly in the last two years, 62% is the case of the 
mammography test and around 70% for the cervix cytology test. 
 Finally, in order to see whether holding private health insurance influences health 
status, binary variables GOOD_HEALTH and BAD_HEALTH were created. GOOD_HEALTH takes 
values equal to one when the individual perceives a good or very good health status, while 
BAD_HEALTH takes values equal to one if the individual perceives bad or very bad health 
status. The proportion of individuals that perceives good health status is bigger than a bad 
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3 Estimation and results 
3.1 Propensity Score 
 
Individual characteristics are considered to specify and determine the decision of 
having private insurance or not, in particular, the socio-demographic and economics ones, 
such as, gender, age, the size of the population where the individual lives, income, civil status, 
the level of education and labour market status. In addition, dummy variables regarding the 
health habits and status of individuals are also considered. These variables accurately 
represent if individuals have a healthy diet, drink, smoke or practice some exercise regularly, 
and if they had some pathology in the past. 
Table A.2 in the appendix shows the results of the mentioned estimation. The first 
column shows the name of the variable, followed by the coefficient and its level of 
significance, and the last one shows the standard error. Table A.2 ends with the number of 
observations and the pseudo R2 as a measure of the fit of the estimated model.  
The results show that individuals who live in towns with a large population, live alone, 
with high income and high level of education, have a high probability to have private health 
insurance.   
The positive effect of education is widely known and consistent with the literature. It 
is explained that with a high level of education the standard for the goods consumed is higher 
[González (1995)]. If this standard is not met in the public health sector, it would be expected 
that highly educated individuals demand better services, thus, having a higher probability of 
contracting private health insurance (Sigüenza and Mariel 2015). 
The positive influence of a higher level of income on the probability of purchasing 
private health insurance also corresponds to what has been expressed in the literature of the 
demand for private health insurance. In the Spanish case, as a consequence of universal health 
coverage, individuals who opt for private health coverage have to face a double cost for their 
health services. One direct cost, the insurance premium, and another indirect cost through 
taxation for public health services. It is therefore consistent that those with higher income are 
more likely to choose the extra coverage. 
The negative relationship shown between the type of household and the probability 
of having private health insurance is linked to the costs of the insurance prime. Individuals 
who live alone face cheaper insurance policies compared to households with more family 
members, increasing their probability to have private health coverage. In that sense, the 
negative relationship obtained for those who live in small towns could be explained as the lack 
of infrastructure of private insurance companies in such populations [Urbanos (2000), 
Sigüenza and Mariel (2015)]. 
Gender is not statistically significant in order to explain the probability of having 
private health insurance. Only the coefficient of the square of age was negative and 
statistically significant at 10% of significant level. This would give a slight indication that the 
older the individual, the less likely he or she is to engage private coverage. This is consistent 
with the fact that the older the individual, the more expensive the insurance premium, 
discouraging the purchase of insurance.  
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Regarding the autonomous community where the individuals live, the results show 
that in the majority of the communities individuals are less likely to have private health 
insurance in comparison with those from Andalucia. It is only in Balears, Cataluña and Madrid 
where it is more likely to have double coverage than the baseline category. To finish with the 
socio-economic characteristics of individuals, being unemployed or not being able to work 
reduces the probability of having private health insurance in comparison with those who are 
employed, showing that, as it would be expected, the uncertainty or the lack of income 
discourages the purchase of private health insurance. 
None of the thirty health status dummy created to reflect any kind of possible 
pathologies that the individual may present, seem to have an influence on the decision of 
having private health insurance individually. Moreover, in order to extend the analysis, a test 
of the joint hypothesis that all these dummy variables are jointly significant was performed. 
The result from the test indicates a chi-squared value of 30.95 and a p-value of 0.42, denoting 
that all these dummy variables are jointly insignificant. These results indicate that the 
individual health status does not have any influence on contracting private health insurance. 
Furthermore, neither of the unhealthy habits that were considered nor the regular 
consumption of fruit, vegetables or legumes seem to have a significant effect on having private 
health insurance. Altogether, these results lead to take heed of, as Szabó (1997) expressed, 
the absence of adverse selection in the health insurance market in Spain. 
Having been hospitalized in the last twelve months and doing exercise regularly are 
the factors that contribute positively to having private health insurance under this aspect. 
Moreover, those whose main work activity is done seated are more likely to have private 
health insurance than those who exert some level of exercise or physical effort on their work. 
This could be related to the fact that due to a lack of exercise, individuals may seek more 
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3.2 Average Treatment Effect 
 
The definition of the propensity score allows us to apply different techniques to 
estimate the average treatment effect on the treated. The structure of the estimations is the 
same, despite the outcome being analyzed change, that is, the average treatment effect on 
the treated is estimated for each outcome using matching on the propensity score and inverse 
probability weighting. 
The estimates are reported in Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. Each table is divided into 
subtables, and each subtable considers different outcomes. The first column of each subtable 
reports the implemented estimation methods, that is, one to one matching on the propensity 
score (m=1), one to four matching on the propensity score (m=4) and inverse probability 
weighting (IPW). The second column of each subtable, reports the average treatment effect 
on the treated estimates (ATET), while the third and fourth columns report the standard error 
(Std. Err) and the p-value of the estimation (P> |z|). Finally, the number of observations used 
on the estimation is reported in the last row (n). 
Following Cantarero et al. (2017) Subtables 2.1 and 2.2, shows the estimations of the 
average treatment effect on the treated for the number of consultations to a general 
practitioner or a specialist. 
Results in Table 2 are consistent with the ones found by the authors cited above. 
Considering the number of visits to a general practitioner, results in Subtable 2.1 show that, 
there is no statistical difference on the average of consultations of this kind between those 
individuals who have private health insurance and those who do not. However, a difference is 
found in the average number of visits to a specialist doctor. Results in Subtable 2.2 depict that 
double-coverage individuals, on average, visit a specialist 10% more times than those who 
only have public health coverage. 
 
Table 2: Average Treatment Effect estimates on general practitioner and specialist visits 
Table 2.1: Number Visit General Practitioner Table 2.2: Number Visit Specialist 
  ATET Std. Err P>|z|   ATET Std. Err P>|z| 
m=1 0.003 0.034 0.936 m=1 0.100 0.034 0.003 
m=4 0.017 0.028 0.548 m=4 0.109 0.027 0.000 
IPW 0.020 0.027 0.454 IPW 0.099 0.026 0.000 
n = 13.659       n = 9.718       
Source: Author's elaboration from SNHS 
 
To identify whether there are differences in the preventive health services, I first 
considered the correct follow-up of general medical checks. Table 3 is divided into Subtables 
3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 each one showing the estimation of the average treatment effect on the 
treated for general exams done in the last twelve months, blood pressure and level of 
cholesterol and sugar in blood checked in the last twelve months, respectively. 
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It can be inferred that, on average, having extra health coverage promotes a more 
intensive use of general medical checks. The results show that, on average, those who have 
private health insurance have taken a general exam 4% more times than those who only have 
public health coverage.  
Concerning the correct follow-up of the cholesterol level, it is obtained that, on 
average, those individuals who have private health insurance take this test 5% more times 
than those who have only public health coverage. 
Finally, individuals with double coverage have checked the level of sugar in the blood, 
on average, about 6% more times than those who only have public health coverage.  
The results are ambiguous considering the outcome that measures the correct follow-
up of the blood pressure in the last twelve months, it varies depending on the estimation 
method implemented and the significance level considered. 
 
Table 3: Average Treatment Effect estimates on the correct follow-up of general medical checks 
Table 3.1: General Exams in last twelve months 
Table 3.2: Checked Blood Pressure in last twelve 
months 
  ATET Std. Err P>|z|   ATET Std. Err P>|z| 
m=1 0.044 0.016 0.005 m=1 0.033 0.015 0.027 
m=4 0.049 0.012 0.000 m=4 0.018 0.012 0.119 
IPW 0.052 0.011 0.000 IPW 0.028 0.011 0.009 
n = 16.511       n = 16.011       
     
Table 3.3: Checked Cholesterol in last twelve 
months 
Table 3.4: Checked Sugar in Blood in last twelve 
months 
  ATET Std. Err P>|z|   ATET Std. Err P>|z| 
m=1 0.063 0.015 0.000 m=1 0.070 0.016 0.000 
m=4 0.056 0.012 0.000 m=4 0.057 0.012 0.000 
IPW 0.054 0.010 0.000 IPW 0.058 0.011 0.000 
n = 15.969       n = 15.826       
Source: Author's elaboration from SNHS 
 
As a second approach for the analysis for preventive health services, the correct follow-
up of oncological examinations was considered. Table 4 shows ATET estimates for the follow-
up on oncologist checks. 
Due to the fact that these types of exams are under a health screening policy, two 
estimates for each outcome were computed: one for the entire population and another for 
the specific gender and age group where the screening policy is implemented.  
The subtables in the left-hand side of Table 4 (Subtable 4.1, Subtable 4.3 and Subtable 
4.5) report the results considering the entire sample, while the estimates reported in the 
subtables on the right-hand side (Subtable 4.2, Subtable 4.4 and Subtable 4.6) are obtained 
only considering the individuals under the screening target population.  
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Again, for those under the screening target population, results show that there is no 
statistical difference in the average use of oncology checks between those who have private 
health insurance and those who do not. In other words, when the estimates are restricted for 
the specific gender and age group, none of the coefficients of the ATET estimates are 
statistically significant.  
However, when the entire population is considered, statistical differences are found 
on average, in the use of mammography and cervix cytology tests between treated and 
control groups. Particularly, females with private health insurance, on average, have taken at 
least a mammography check in the last two years around 13% more times than those females 
who only have public health coverage. Moreover, this difference is around 8% for the cervix 
cytology test. 
 
Table 4: Average Treatment Effect estimates on oncology check-ups 
Table 4.1: Mammography test in last two years Table 4.2: Mammography test in last two years 
Entire sample ATET Std. Err P>|z| Screening sample ATET Std. Err P>|z| 
m=1 0.140 0.026 0.000 m=1 0.010 0.028 0.711 
m=4 0.131 0.019 0.000 m=4 0.016 0.020 0.442 
IPW 0.130 0.019 0.000 IPW 0.026 0.022 0.237 
n = 5.747       n = 2.677       
        
Table 4.3: Stool test in last two years Table 4.4: Stool test in last two years 
Entire sample ATET Std. Err P>|z| Screening sample ATET Std. Err P>|z| 
m=1 -0.010 0.031 0.749 m=1 -0.018 0.035 0.600 
m=4 -0.003 0.024 0.898 m=4  0.002 0.015 0.877 
IPW  0.003 0.029 0.930 IPW  0.005 0.038 0.892 
n = 3.172       n = 1.716       
        
Table 4.5: Cervix cytology test in last two years Table 4.6: Cervix cytology test in last two years 
Entire sample ATET Std. Err P>|z| Screening sample ATET Std. Err P>|z| 
m=1 0.080 0.017 0.000 m=1 -0.021 0.028 0.450 
m=4 0.081 0.012 0.000 m=4  0.004 0.023 0.876 
IPW 0.078 0.012 0.000 IPW -0.005 0.029 0.854 
n = 6.547       n = 730       
Source: Author's elaboration from SNHS 
 
In order to corroborate these differences and add robustness to the analysis, following 
the same procedure the ATET was estimated for the same outcomes but excluding the age 
group of the screening target population. Table 5 is divided into Subtable 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 
showing the ATET estimate on mammography, stool and cervix cytology tests respectively. On 
average, statistical mean differences are found on the check of the mammography and cervix 
cytology test between those females who have double health coverage and those who only 
have public health coverage. 
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Table 5: Average Treatment Effect estimates on oncology check-ups without screening age sample 
Table 5.1: Mammography test in last two years Table 5.2: Stool test in last two years 
  ATET Std. Err P>|z|   ATET Std. Err P>|z| 
m=1 0.228 0.040 0.000 m=1 -0.026 0.048 0.579 
m=4 0.236 0.032 0.000 m=4 0.011 0.021 0.606 
IPW 0.228 0.031 0.000 IPW 0.014 0.058 0.810 
n = 3.069       n = 1.402       
      
Table 5.3: Cervix cytology test in last two years       
  ATET Std. Err P>|z|     
m=1 0.110 0.025 0.000     
m=4 0.113 0.016 0.000     
IPW 0.107 0.015 0.000     
n = 5.817           
 Source: Author's elaboration from SNHS 
 
It might be the case that the privately insured individuals make use of preventive 
health services more frequently because they perceive themselves to be less healthy. To see 
if this is the case, I estimated the effect of holding private health insurance on self-assessed 
health status, following the same methodology as before. Table 6 is divided into Subtables 6.1 
and 6.2, reporting the average treatment effect on the treated for good and bad self-assessed 
health status, respectively. 
The results of both Subtables 6.1 and 6.2 show that, on average, there are no statistical 
differences in individuals' self-perceived health status between the publicly and privately 
insured. Contrasting the previous idea, the results obtained indicate that having private 
insurance does not improve self-assessed health status. 
 
Table 6: Average Treatment Effect estimates on Self-Assessed Health Status 
Table 6.1: Self-Assessed Good Health Table 6.2: Self-Assessed Bad Health 
  ATET Std. Err P>|z|   ATET Std. Err P>|z| 
m=1 0.006 0.014 0.687 m=1 -0.011 0.009 0.198 
m=4 0.004 0.010 0.716 m=4 -0.008 0.006 0.229 
IPW 0.006 0.009 0.483 IPW -0.006 0.005 0.246 
n = 16.524       n = 16.524       
Source: Author's elaboration from SNHS 
 
Finally, to analyze whether individuals with public health coverage suffer longer 
waiting lists, ATET was estimated for the outcome that captures no medical attention due to 
the long waiting list in the last twelve months, following the same procedure as before. Table 
7 depicts that the frequency with which individuals with double coverage have experienced 
no medical attention due to the long waiting list is, on average, between 4 and 5% lower 
compared to those with only public health coverage. 
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Table 7: Average Treatment Effect estimates on long waiting list 
No attention due to long waiting list in last 12 months 
  ATET Std. Err P>|z| 
m=1 -0.047 0.013 0.000 
m=4 -0.050 0.010 0.000 
IPW -0.043 0.009 0.000 
n = 16.518       
Source: Author's elaboration from SNHS 
 
Last but not least, for the results obtained to have internal validity, it is necessary to 
have a balance on the characteristics between control and treatment groups, that is, covariate 
balance. Table A.3 in the appendix shows the results of the covariate balance analysis that was 
performed by computing the standardized mean difference of the covariates used in the 
estimations. Covariate balance was achieved since these differences lay around zero for the 
matched sample, and more so for the weighted sample. Figure A.1 in the appendix, depicts 
the propensity score distribution of the treatment and control groups. As covariates balance 
was achieved, the propensity score distributions for the matched sample is very similar 
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The latest micro-data from the Spanish National Health Survey 2017 revealed 
differences in the use of the Spanish health care system between publicly insured individuals 
and those with double coverage. Thus, making it possible to assess the effect of having private 
health insurance on the use of the healthcare system.  
In line with other works, e.g. González and Clavero (2009), Cantarero et al. (2017), the 
differences in the number of visits to a general practitioner and visits to a specialist in the 
Spanish health care system were analysed. However, as a distinguishing feature of this work, 
the analysis of the use of the health care system was focused on the preventive health care 
services, particularly, on the correct follow-up of general medical checks and preventive 
oncology checks. 
This was achieved by applying causal inference analysis, estimating the average 
treatment effect on the treated, by means of matching on the propensity score and inverse 
probability weighting. 
The results have shown that individuals with double coverage do better in the area of 
preventive health monitoring.  
On average, privately insured individuals have general medical check-ups more 
frequently than those individuals who only have public health coverage. As previously 
discussed, one possible reason to justify this result could be that the budget cuts on public 
health services may have deteriorated these services, mainly represented by the long waiting 
lists that users face.  
In contrast, individuals with private health insurance face long waiting lists to a lesser 
extent to obtain consultations with a specialist or any general exam. In line with this idea, it 
was found that the frequency with which individuals without private insurance receive no 
medical attention due to the long waiting list is between 4 and 5% higher than individuals with 
private insurance. 
Regarding the oncology checks, when the screening sample is considered, there was 
no statistical difference in means between those who have private health insurance and those 
with only public coverage. Nevertheless, when the analysis was extended to the entire 
population, it was found that individuals with private health insurance do this type of exam 
more often than those with public health coverage. This difference is quantitatively large for 
mammograms and cervix cytology tests. 
When the oncology checks are not under the screening target population, individuals 
covered by the public health sector do not have direct access to these kinds of exams. This 
could be the reason for the existing differences in the use of oncology checks between the 
treated and untreated groups. When, as a robustness check, the individuals in the age group 
of the screening population were not considered in the analysis, it was obtained that females 
with private health insurance check more often on mammography and cervix cytology test, in 
comparison with those females with only public health coverage. This result reinforces the 
idea that females without private health insurance have had fewer preventive check-ups due 
to the lack of coverage by the public system. 
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It could be expected that those individuals that hire private health insurance and use 
health services more often, would have a different perception about their health status. That 
is, that those individuals with a worse self-assessed health status could have a higher 
probability to hire private insurance and use health services more frequently.  
Considering the results from the self-assessed health status, it could be said that there 
are no differences between treated and control groups. In that sense, those who have private 
health insurance do not perceive themselves healthier than those with public health coverage.  
However, self-assessed health status is not an objective outcome in order to address 
the actual wellbeing of an individual's health. Therefore, this analysis should be 
complemented by focusing on whether there are differences in the actual health status 
between individuals who have private health insurance and those who do not.  
Preventive checks are one of the main resources to prevent future diseases, so, 
differences in the use of preventive checks may influence differences in future health status. 
Since differences in the correct follow-up of general and oncology checks were found, it is 
inescapable to question whether private health coverage could lead to the polarization of 
health status.  
Finally, when assessing the effect of tax benefit on private health insurance holders, 
bear in mind that this could not only be an unfair and regressive measure in terms of resources 
but also in terms of individuals health status, since there are indeed differences in the use of 
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Table A.1: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics using the SNHS 
Name Definition Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
FEMALE 1 if female, 0 otherwise 0.541 0.498 
AGE Individual´s age 53.436 18.895 




NATIONALITY 1 if Spanish, 0 otherwise 0.903 0.296 
Autonomous Communities   
Andalucia 1 if lives in Andalucia, 0 otherwise 0.127 0.333 
Aragon 1 if lives in Aragon, 0 otherwise 0.045 0.208 
Asturias 1 if lives in Asturias, 0 otherwise 0.036 0.187 
Balears 1 if lives in Balears, 0 otherwise 0.040 0.196 
Canarias 1 if lives in Canarias, 0 otherwise 0.049 0.215 
Cantabria 1 if lives in Cantabria, 0 otherwise 0.035 0.183 
Castilla y Leon 1 if lives in Castilla y Leon, 0 otherwise 0.056 0.229 
Castilla y La Mancha 1 if lives in Castilla y La Mancha, 0 otherwise 0.049 0.215 
Cataluña 1 if lives in Cataluña, 0 otherwise 0.102 0.303 
Valencia 1 if lives in Valencia, 0 otherwise 0.079 0.27 
Extremadura 1 if lives in Extremadura, 0 otherwise 0.041 0.199 
Galicia 1 if lives in Galicia, 0 otherwise 0.058 0.233 
Madrid 1 if lives in Madrid, 0 otherwise 0.088 0.283 
Murcia 1 if lives in Murcia, 0 otherwise 0.044 0.206 
Navarra 1 if lives in Navarra, 0 otherwise 0.034 0.180 
Pais Vasco 1 if lives in Pais Vasco, 0 otherwise 0.065 0.246 
Rioja 1 if lives in Rioja, 0 otherwise 0.029 0.168 
Ceuta 1 if lives in Ceuta, 0 otherwise 0.011 0.105 
Melilla 1 if lives in Melilla, 0 otherwise 0.012 0.110 
TOWN_SIZE Municipality Size  
> 500.000  0.117 0.321 
Municipality Capital 0.217 0.413 
100.000-500.000 0.08 0.271 
50.000-100.000 0.086 0.281 
20.000-50.000  0.156 0.362 
10.000-20.000  0.112 0.315 
< 10.000  0.232 0.422 
HSIZE Household Size 2.472 1.235 
HOUSEHOLD_TYPE Household Type  
One-person household 0.248 0.432 
Single couple  0.24 0.427 
Couple with a child under 25 0.270 0.444 
Couple with all children aged 25 or over 0.066 0.249 
Father or mother alone, with a child under 25 0.052 0.221 
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Single parent, with all children 25 or over 0.050 0.218 
Couple or father or mother alone, with a children under 25 and other people 0.029 0.169 
Another type of home 0.045 0.207 
MINOR 1 if there are at least one minor in the household, 0 otherwise 0.238 0.426 
CIVIL_STATUS Civil Status   
Single  0.255 0.436 
Married  0.541 0.498 
Widow  0.129 0.335 
Separated  0.024 0.154 
Divorced  0.051 0.219 
EDUC Max Education Level  
Less than Primary School 0.119 0.324 
Primary School 0.193 0.395 
Less than Secondary School 0.240 0.427 
Secondary School 0.191 0.393 
Superior or University 0.258 0.437 
OCCUP Occupation Status  
Employed  0.430 0.495 
Unemployed  0.108 0.31 
Retired  0.286 0.452 
Student  0.057 0.231 
Not able  0.025 0.157 
Domestic Chores 0.093 0.291 
Others  0.001 0.035 
INCOME Household Income  
< 570  0.062 0.240 
570-800  0.126 0.332 
800-1050  0.161 0.368 
1050-1300  0.124 0.329 
1300-1550  0.120 0.325 
1550-1800  0.066 0.248 
1800-2200  0.126 0.331 
2200-2700  0.092 0.289 
2700-3600  0.079 0.270 
3600-4500  0.026 0.159 
4500-6000  0.015 0.120 
> 6000  0.004 0.064 
PUBLIC_INSURANCE 1 if individual has public insurance, 0 otherwise 0.956 0.205 
PRIVATE_INDIVIDUAL 




1 if individual has private insurance taken out by the company, 0 
otherwise 
0.031 0.175 
PRIVATE_INSURANCE 1 if individual has private insurance, 0 otherwise 0.140 0.347 
ONLY_PUBLIC 1 if individual has only public insurance, 0 otherwise 0.829 0.376 
ONLY_PRIVATE 1 if individual has only private insurance, 0 otherwise 0.008 0.089 
DOUBLE_COVERAGE 1 if individual has public and private insurance, 0 otherwise 0.131 0.338 
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WITHOUT_INSURANCE 1 if individual has not insurance, 0 otherwise 0.001 0.030 
HEALTH_CONDITIONS Previous Health Conditions  
High Pressure 1 if have had high pressure, 0 otherwise 0.276 0.447 
Heart Attack 1 if have had heart attack, 0 otherwise 0.024 0.152 
Coronary Heart Disease 1 if have had coronary heart disease, 0 otherwise 0.022 0.148 
Other Heart Disease 1 if have had other heart disease, 0 otherwise 0.069 0.253 
Osteoarthritis 1 if have had osteaoarthritis, 0 otherwise 0.237 0.425 
Chronic Cervical Pain 1 if have had chronic cervical pain, 0 otherwise 0.179 0.384 
Chronic Lumbar Pain 1 if have had chronic lumbar pain, 0 otherwise 0.234 0.423 
Chronic Allergy 1 if have had chronic allergy, 0 otherwise 0.170 0.376 
Asthma 1 if have had asthma, 0 otherwise 0.061 0.24 
Chronic Bronchitis 1 if have had chronic bronchitis, 0 otherwise 0.051 0.221 
Diabetes 1 if have had diabetes, 0 otherwise 0.099 0.298 
Stomach Ulcer 1 if have had stomach ulcer, 0 otherwise 0.047 0.211 
Urinary Incontinence 1 if have had urinary incontinence, 0 otherwise 0.063 0.244 
High Cholesterol 1 if have had high cholesterol, 0 otherwise 0.240 0.427 
Waterfalls 1 if have had waterfalls, 0 otherwise 0.130 0.337 
Chronic Skin Problems 1 if have had chronic skin problems, 0 otherwise 0.064 0.244 
Chronic Constipation 1 if have had chronic constipation, 0 otherwise 0.050 0.218 
Cirrhosis 1 if have had cirrhosis, 0 otherwise 0.015 0.122 
Depression 1 if have had depression, 0 otherwise 0.116 0.32 
Chronic Anxiety 1 if have had chronic anxiety, 0 otherwise 0.099 0.298 
Other Mental Problems 1 if have had other mental problems, 0 otherwise 0.022 0.147 
Ictus 1 if have had ictus, 0 otherwise 0.022 0.147 
Migraine 1 if have had migraine, 0 otherwise 0.113 0.317 
Hemorrhoids 1 if have had hemorrhoids, 0 otherwise 0.085 0.279 
Malignant Tumors 1 if have had malignant tumors, 0 otherwise 0.051 0.221 
Osteoporosis 1 if have had osteoporosis, 0 otherwise 0.053 0.224 
Thyroid Problems 1 if have had thyroid problems, 0 otherwise 0.071 0.258 
Kidney Problems 1 if have had kidney problems, 0 otherwise 0.051 0.220 
Injuries Accident 1 if have had injuries accident, 0 otherwise 0.065 0.246 
SMOKE 1 if smoker, 0 otherwise 0.234 0.423 
REGULAR_SMOKE 1 if smoke regularly, 0 otherwise 0.212 0.409 
DRINK 1 if consumes alcohol regularly, 0 otherwise 0.213 0.41 
OBESE 1 if obese, 0 otherwise 0.169 0.375 
CHRONIC 1 if have chronic condition, 0 otherwise 0.693 0.461 
LIMIT 1 if individual has a limitation, 0 otherwise 0.294 0.455 
EXERCISE_ACTIVITY Exercise In Main Activity  
Seated  0.386 0.487 
Standing up  0.431 0.495 
Walking-carrying weight 0.121 0.327 
Great physical effort 0.025 0.156 
Not applicable 0.037 0.188 
EXERCISE Exercise Frequency  
None  0.385 0.487 
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Occasionally  0.392 0.488 
Several times a month 0.110 0.313 
Several times a week 0.113 0.317 
REGULAR_EXERCISE 1 if exercise regularly, 0 otherwise 0.224 0.417 
REGULAR_FRUIT 1 if consumes fruit regularly, 0 otherwise 0.790 0.407 
REGULAR_VEGETABLE 1 if consumes vegetables regularly, 0 otherwise 0.699 0.459 
REGULAR_LEGUME 1 if consumes legume regularly, 0 otherwise 0.261 0.439 
SELF_ASSESSED_HEALTH Self-Assessed Health  
Very_good  0.181 0.385 
Good  0.483 0.500 
Regular  0.240 0.427 
Bad  0.075 0.263 
Very_bad  0.022 0.145 
GOOD_HEALTH 1 if good or very good SAH, 0 otherwise 0.664 0.472 
BAD_HEALTH 1 if bad or very bad SAH, 0 otherwise 0.096 0.295 
GENERAL_PRACTITIONE
R 
1 if have visited general practitioner in last 4 weeks, 0 otherwise 0.373 0.484 
VISITS_PRACTITIONER Number of visits to general practitioner in the last 4 weeks 0.484 0.834 
SPECIALIST 1 if visited specialist in last 4 weeks, 0 otherwise 0.238 0.426 
VISITS_SPECIALIST Number of visits to specialist in the last 4 weeks 0.328 0.787 
EXAMS 1 if have done health exam in last 12 months, 0 otherwise 0.762 0.426 
HOSPITALIZATION 1 if have been hospitalized in last 12 months, 0 otherwise 0.089 0.285 
NUMBER_HOSPITALIZATI
ON 
Number of hospitalization in last 12 months 1.351 1.039 
EMERGENCY 1 if have used emergency, 0 otherwise 0.299 0.458 
NUMBER_EMERGENCY Emergency use in last 12 months 1.806 3.022 
PRESCRIPTION 
1 if have taken prescription medicine in the last 2 weeks, 0 
otherwise 
0.605 0.489 
BLOOD_PRESSURE 1 if have checked blood pressure, 0 otherwise 0.971 0.167 
CORRECT_BLOOD_PRESS
URE 
1 if have checked blood pressure in last 12 months, 0 otherwise 0.789 0.408 
CHOLESTEROL 1 if have checked cholesterol, 0 otherwise 0.969 0.174 
CORRECT_CHOLESTEROL 1 if have checked cholesterol in last 12 months, 0 otherwise 0.789 0.408 
BLOOD_SUGAR 1 if have check blood sugar, 0 otherwise 0.962 0.192 
CORRECT_BLOOD_SUGA
R 
1 if have check blood sugar in last 12 months, 0 otherwise 0.785 0.411 
STOOLTEST 1 if have done stool test, 0 otherwise 0.190 0.392 
CORRECT_STOOLTEST 1 if have done stool test in last 2 years, 0 otherwise 0.655 0.475 
MAMMOGRAPHY 1 if have done mammography, 0 otherwise 0.645 0.479 
CORRECT_MAMMOGRAP
HY 
1 if have done mammography in last 2 years, 0 otherwise 0.626 0.484 
PAP 1 if have done PAP, 0 otherwise 0.754 0.431 
CORRECT_PAP1 1 if have done PAP in last 3 years, 0 otherwise 0.695 0.46 
CORRECT_PAP2 1 if have done PAP in last 5 years, 0 otherwise 0.790 0.407 
WAITING_LIST 1 if no attention due to long waiting list, 0 otherwise 0.163 0.369 
ECONOMIC_PROBLEMS 1 if no attention due to economic problems, 0 otherwise 0.023 0.149 
   Source: Author's elaboration from SNHS 
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Table A.2: Logistic estimation 
Name Coef.  St.Err. 
FEMALE 0.037  0.062 
AGE 0.010  0.013 
AGESQ -0.000 * 0.000 
TOWN_SIZE    
Municipality Capital 0.051  0.108 
100.000-500.000 -0.272 ** 0.116 
50.000-100.000 -0.017  0.117 
20.000-50.000 -0.159  0.108 
10.000-20.000 -0.118  0.116 
< 10.000 -0.285 *** 0.108 
HOUSEHOLD_TYPE   
Single couple -0.484 *** 0.119 
Couple with a child under 25 -0.631 *** 0.134 
Couple with all children aged 25 or over -0.911 *** 0.158 
Father or mother alone, with a child under 25 -0.277 * 0.148 
Single parent, with all children 25 or over -0.507 *** 0.160 
Couple or father or mother alone, with a children under 25 and other people -1.412 *** 0.245 
Another type of home -0.484 *** 0.172 
NATIONALITY 0.160 * 0.096 
MINOR 0.164 * 0.094 
INCOME    
< 570 -0.799 *** 0.213 
570-800 -0.922 *** 0.185 
800-1050 -0.156  0.125 
1300-1550 0.339 *** 0.118 
1550-1800 0.416 *** 0.132 
1800-2200 0.577 *** 0.113 
2200-2700 0.729 *** 0.119 
2700-3600 0.988 *** 0.122 
3600-4500 1.344 *** 0.152 
4500-6000 1.626 *** 0.174 
> 6000 2.357 *** 0.281 
AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITIES  
Aragon -0.176  0.149 
Asturias -0.434 *** 0.164 
Balears 0.714 *** 0.136 
Canarias -0.617 *** 0.214 
Cantabria -1.316 *** 0.336 
Castilla y Leon -0.524 *** 0.149 
Castilla y La Mancha -0.423 ** 0.172 
Cataluña 0.478 *** 0.103 
Valencia -0.412 *** 0.121 
Extremadura -1.568 *** 0.270 
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Galicia -0.378 ** 0.156 
Madrid 0.718 *** 0.111 
Murcia -0.938 *** 0.165 
Navarra -0.833 *** 0.179 
Pais Vasco -0.206 * 0.121 
Rioja -0.470 ** 0.189 
Ceuta -0.173  0.245 
Melilla -0.682 ** 0.288 
CIVIL_STATUS   
Married 0.156  0.106 
Widow 0.262 * 0.144 
Separated -0.367  0.225 
Divorced 0.081  0.135 
EDUC    
Less than Primary School -0.784 *** 0.205 
Less than Secondary School 0.524 *** 0.113 
Secondary School 0.808 *** 0.112 
Superior or University 0.831 *** 0.113 
OCCUP    
Unemployed -0.356 *** 0.120 
Retired -0.019  0.120 
Student -0.279  0.171 
Not able -0.849 *** 0.276 
Domestic Chores -0.128  0.140 
HIGH_PRESSURE -0.034  0.080 
HEART_ATTACK -0.175  0.240 
CORONARY_HEART_DISEASE 0.340  0.209 
OTHER_HEART_DISEASE 0.116  0.129 
OSTEOARTHRITIS -0.019  0.090 
CHRONIC_CERVICAL_PAIN 0.141  0.086 
CHRONIC_LUMBAR_PAIN 0.038  0.080 
CHRONIC_ALLERGY 0.079  0.072 
ASTHMA 0.008  0.115 
CHRONIC_BRONCHITIS -0.156  0.153 
DIABETES -0.145  0.125 
STOMACH_ULCER -0.097  0.150 
URINARY_INCONTINENCE -0.070  0.151 
HIGH_CHOLESTEROL -0.061  0.075 
WATERFALLS 0.078  0.118 
CHRONIC_SKIN_PROBLEMS -0.022  0.110 
CHRONIC_CONSTIPATION 0.062  0.142 
CIRRHOSIS 0.079  0.235 
DEPRESSION -0.047  0.116 
CHRONIC_ANXIETY 0.138  0.111 
OTHER_MENTAL_PROBLEMS -0.386  0.296 
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ICTUS -0.298  0.262 
MIGRAINE -0.025  0.089 
HEMORRHOIDS 0.060  0.099 
MALIGNANT TUMORS -0.185  0.143 
OSTEOPOROSIS 0.271 * 0.142 
THYROID_PROBLEMS 0.125  0.104 
KIDNEY_PROBLEMS -0.097  0.142 
INJURIES_ACCIDENT 0.155  0.104 
HOSPITALIZATION 0.358 *** 0.099 
REGULAR_SMOKE -0.114 * 0.069 
DRINK 0.078  0.067 
OBESE -0.067  0.081 
CHRONIC 0.061  0.075 
LIMIT -0.026  0.078 
PRESCRIPTION -0.041  0.068 
EXERCISE_ACTIVITY    
Standing up -0.255 *** 0.061 
Walking-carrying weight -0.324 *** 0.09 
Great physical effort -0.304 * 0.172 
REGULAR_EXCERCISE 0.178 *** 0.062 
REGULAR_FRUIT -0.036  0.070 
REGULAR_VEGETABLES 0.055  0.067 
REGULAR_LEGUME -0.016  0.062 
Constant -2.431 *** 0.361 
Number of obs 16.524   
Pseudo R2 0.180   
Significance 1%***  5%**  10%*    
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Figure A.1: Boxplot: propensity score distributions 
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Table A.3: Covariate balance 












FEMALE -0.017 -0.014 -0.017 -0.006 
AGE -0.532 0.002 -0.532 0.001 
AGESQ -0.564 0.001 -0.564 -0.001 
TOWN_SIZE     
Municipality Capital 0.016 -0.037 0.016 -0.013 
100.000-500.000 0.014 0.016 0.014 0.007 
50.000-100.000 0.055 -0.003 0.055 0.004 
20.000-50.000 -0.052 0.006 -0.052 -0.001 
10.000-20.000 -0.034 -0.002 -0.034 0.001 
< 10.000 -0.294 -0.013 -0.294 -0.005 
HOUSEHOLD_TYPE    
Single couple -0.112 0.030 -0.112 -0.008 
Couple with a child under 25 0.372 0.028 0.372 0.028 
Couple with all children aged 25 or over -0.103 -0.026 -0.103 -0.009 
Father or mother alone, with a child under 25 0.046 -0.007 0.046 0.000 
Single parent, with all children 25 or over -0.122 0.005 -0.122 -0.004 
Couple or father or mother alone, with a children under 25 
and other people 
-0.100 -0.049 -0.100 -0.024 
Another type of home -0.040 0.000 -0.040 0.002 
NATIONALITY -0.021 -0.017 -0.021 -0.010 
MINOR 0.317 0.000 0.317 0.022 
INCOME     
< 570 -0.241 -0.029 -0.241 -0.001 
570-800 -0.450 -0.005 -0.450 0.001 
800-1050 -0.291 0.029 -0.291 0.002 
1300-1550 -0.054 0.005 -0.054 -0.001 
1550-1800 0.018 -0.026 0.018 -0.009 
1800-2200 0.116 -0.022 0.116 -0.008 
2200-2700 0.226 -0.014 0.226 0.002 
2700-3600 0.336 0.020 0.336 -0.001 
3600-4500 0.266 0.043 0.266 0.005 
4500-6000 0.230 -0.058 0.230 0.011 
> 6000 0.187 -0.019 0.187 0.017 
AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITIES    
Aragon 0.013 -0.029 0.013 -0.003 
Asturias -0.091 -0.018 -0.091 -0.001 
Balears 0.128 0.035 0.128 0.001 
Canarias -0.104 -0.016 -0.104 0.002 
Cantabria -0.170 -0.018 -0.170 -0.002 
Castilla y Leon -0.077 0.042 -0.077 -0.014 
Castilla y La Mancha -0.117 0.009 -0.117 -0.008 
Cataluña 0.210 0.040 0.210 -0.009 
Joaquin Alzugaray: Master in Economics EAP 





Valencia -0.104 -0.033 -0.104 0.008 
Extremadura -0.214 0.037 -0.214 -0.001 
Galicia -0.143 0.000 -0.143 0.008 
Madrid 0.342 -0.023 0.342 0.014 
Murcia -0.114 0.037 -0.114 0.005 
Navarra -0.069 0.000 -0.069 0.001 
Pais Vasco 0.049 -0.011 0.049 -0.005 
Rioja -0.027 -0.053 -0.027 -0.008 
Ceuta -0.040 -0.022 -0.040 -0.002 
Melilla -0.005 0.000 -0.005 -0.005 
CIVIL_STATUS     
Married 0.124 0.017 0.124 0.010 
Widow -0.306 -0.026 -0.306 0.007 
Separated -0.090 -0.038 -0.090 0.000 
Divorced 0.028 0.026 0.028 -0.002 
EDUC     
Less than Primary School -0.538 0.000 -0.538 0.000 
Less than Secondary School -0.139 0.041 -0.139 0.005 
Secondary School 0.181 0.036 0.181 0.003 
Superior or University 0.616 -0.054 0.616 -0.009 
OCCUP     
Unemployed -0.115 -0.034 -0.115 0.011 
Retired -0.432 0.006 -0.432 -0.001 
Student 0.077 0.021 0.077 0.004 
Not able -0.184 -0.014 -0.184 -0.006 
Domestic Chores -0.231 -0.017 -0.231 0.007 
HIGH_PRESSURE -0.360 0.009 -0.360 0.003 
HEART_ATTACK -0.127 0.051 -0.127 -0.004 
CORONARY_HEART_DISEASE -0.085 0.027 -0.085 -0.001 
OTHER_HEART_DISEASE -0.170 0.051 -0.170 -0.002 
OSTEOARTHRITIS -0.374 -0.006 -0.374 -0.004 
CHRONIC_CERVICAL_PAIN -0.132 0.033 -0.132 -0.002 
CHRONIC_LUMBAR_PAIN -0.185 -0.002 -0.185 0.004 
CHRONIC_ALLERGY 0.101 0.059 0.101 0.009 
ASTHMA -0.032 0.018 -0.032 0.005 
CHRONIC_BRONCHITIS -0.159 -0.016 -0.159 -0.003 
DIABETES -0.280 0.022 -0.280 -0.004 
STOMACH_ULCER -0.137 -0.020 -0.137 -0.015 
URINARY_INCONTINENCE -0.225 0.019 -0.225 -0.002 
HIGH_CHOLESTEROL -0.244 0.041 -0.244 0.009 
WATERFALLS -0.329 -0.016 -0.329 0.005 
CHRONIC_SKIN_PROBLEMS -0.017 0.017 -0.017 0.005 
CHRONIC_CONSTIPATION -0.088 0.055 -0.088 0.003 
CIRRHOSIS -0.054 0.048 -0.054 0.001 
DEPRESSION -0.250 0.019 -0.250 -0.009 
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CHRONIC_ANXIETY -0.096 0.020 -0.096 0.008 
OTHER_MENTAL_PROBLEMS -0.165 -0.055 -0.165 -0.003 
ICTUS -0.146 -0.013 -0.146 -0.004 
MIGRAINE -0.052 -0.011 -0.052 -0.001 
HEMORRHOIDS -0.023 -0.007 -0.023 -0.005 
MALIGNANT TUMORS -0.140 0.048 -0.140 0.008 
OSTEOPOROSIS -0.118 0.007 -0.118 0.002 
THYROID_PROBLEMS 0.004 0.026 0.004 0.006 
KIDNEY_PROBLEMS -0.155 0.039 -0.155 0.003 
INJURIES_ACCIDENT 0.006 0.014 0.006 -0.002 
HOSPITALIZATION -0.088 -0.023 -0.088 0.008 
REGULAR_SMOKE -0.034 -0.039 -0.034 -0.016 
DRINK 0.056 -0.037 0.056 0.001 
OBESE -0.195 0.009 -0.195 0.004 
CHRONIC -0.304 0.050 -0.304 -0.004 
LIMIT -0.335 0.002 -0.335 0.012 
PRESCRIPTION -0.389 0.021 -0.389 -0.008 
EXERCISE_ACTIVITY    
Standing up -0.076 -0.005 -0.076 -0.008 
Walking-carrying weight -0.046 0.008 -0.046 -0.006 
Great physical effort 0.025 -0.010 0.025 -0.012 
REGULAR_EXCERCISE 0.377 -0.013 0.377 0.003 
REGULAR_FRUIT -0.051 0.024 -0.051 0.003 
REGULAR_VEGETABLES 0.180 0.009 0.180 -0.017 
REGULAR_LEGUME -0.090 0.009 -0.090 0.013 
Source: Author's elaboration from SNHS 
 
